Most of the coverage coming out of this week's Beijing summit will focus on trade deliverables and investment headlines. Those do matter, but the two issues with significant long-term consequences are Taiwan and AI. On both fronts, the conditions heading into the meeting favour Beijing more than Washington and the connecting thread between them is the same: Xi sees a window of opportunity, and Trump's sitting on the fence.

On Taiwan, Chinese Foreign Minister, Wang Yi, essentially telegraphed Beijing's position ahead of the summit, warning Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, that Taiwan "is the biggest risk in China-U.S. relations" and urging the United States to "make the right choice." The ask is clear: a formal shift from "not supporting" Taiwan independence to explicitly opposing it, limits on arms sales, and pressure on Japan to stay out of any future Taiwan contingency. What makes this particularly concerning is that Trump has already delayed a major arms package to Taiwan and publicly acknowledged discussing arms sales with Xi, which gives Beijing genuine reason to believe the window is open. A senior Taiwanese official put it plainly to Bloomberg: "What we are the most afraid of is to put Taiwan on the menu of the talk between Xi Jinping and President Trump."

The AI conversation carries a similar dynamic. The United States currently holds roughly an eight-month lead over China in AI capability and AI models are doubling in capability every four months, which means an eight-month lead is not the comfortable margin it might sound like. The goal in Beijing should not be reaching an agreement on AI safety, but creating the conditions for one. On the other hand, the U.S can expand the lead to eighteen or twenty-four months through tighter export controls before any substantive negotiation begins. At that margin, Beijing has real incentives to comply; at eight months, it does not...

What ties these two issues together is how Beijing can potentially use one as leverage over the other. Xi could offer economic commitments Trump likes such as: critical minerals flowing, commodity purchases, headline investment figures, in exchange for Taiwan-related concessions or a softer line on AI export controls. That trade would look like a win in a press release and function as a significant strategic setback in practice. Taiwan has made meaningful progress on defense spending and its capabilities in recent years, and that progress is directly tied to confidence in U.S. commitment. Destroy that confidence, and you undermine the investment at precisely the moment it's gaining momentum.

The pattern across both files is one worth watching closely as the summit announcements roll in. Modest AI dialogue paired with softened Taiwan language would be framed as diplomatic progress; it would more accurately represent Beijing ushering a favourable détente, or relaxation of tensions, on its own terms. Only time will tell...

Sources: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-04-24/taiwan-fears-it-ll-be-on-the-menu-at-xi-s-summit-with-trump